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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the sustainability of public finances in the set of 
10 Central and Eastern European countries during 1995-2015. We estimate parameters 
of the fiscal reaction function using fixed effects GLS model. Our results show that the 
primary balance is persistent and appears to be extra reactive to increasing public debt 
(in a corrective manner) and to business cycle fluctuations (in a countercyclical manner) 
in line with the recent literature implying fiscal sustainability in CEE countries. After 
the crisis in 2008 the fiscal response gets even more reactive to the debt, however, 
turning to acyclical. We also find evidence of the ‘fiscal fatigue’ during the crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Finally, the change in fiscal response to interest payments, old age 
dependency ratio and fiscal rule index variables points to the shift in priorities of the 
fiscal authorities as an aftermath of the crisis. All the sudden changes give reason to pay 
extra attention to the topic and conduct further research. 
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1. Introduction 
The concern over ever-increasing debt burden is far from new. Fiscal sustainability is a 
recurrent point of discussion with almost two hundred year history. For a long time 
fiscal sustainability and economic growth was considered as conflicting objectives. The 
financial literature of the previous decades, argues that the economy needs to tolerate 
some positive debt level. If a country has not enough financial deepening it would have 
lower economic growth (see, for example, Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw 
(1973) and more recently King and Levin (1993)). As a result, debt funding has become 
common practice in the advanced economies.  
The recent increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios following the last economic downturn has 
become a wake-up call for governments in most advanced economies to deal with 
unsustainable budgetary plans. Figure 1 shows the evolution of public debt ratios for 
several leading economies. During the “great moderation” (1992 – 2008) governments 
experienced temporary improvement in public finances, leading to overoptimistic 
projections and loosening of the fiscal policy stance.  The access to the foreign markets 
combined with economic recession contributed to the accumulation of external debt in 
European countries. As a result, the EU total deficit has increased sharply from 1% of 
GDP in 2007 to 6.8% of GDP in 2009, and turning back to 1.7% of GDP in 2016 
(Arroyo, 2011). However, in many EU Member States gross national debt levels are 
still close to 100% of GDP, and in some countries have even exceeded this level
1
. 
Ageing populations, expected increases in health care costs and sluggish economic 
growth add urgency to this worrisome trend. According to the European Commission 
Ageing report the old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise from 27.8 percent in 
2015 to 46.1 percent by 2040 (EC, 2015). Under such circumstances any rising debt will 
ultimately prove unsustainable.  
                                                             
1 According to 2016 European Comission report 16 EU Member States reported a debt ratio above 60% of GDP at the end of the 
year: the highest level registered was 179.0% for Greece, followed by 132.6% for Italy, 130.4% for Portugal, 107.8% Cyprus and 
105.8% Belgium. The lowest levels of debt-to-GDP ratios were 9.5% for Estonia, 20.0 % for Luxembourg and 29.5% for Bulgaria. 
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Fig. 1. Trends in public debts ratios in leading economies, 1995-2016 
Source: European Commission AMECO database. 
Macroeconomists ignored this issue for a long time due to the fiscal theory of money 
(Canzoneri, et al. (2001), Marimon (2001)). The main idea is that as long as the Central 
Bank achieves low and stable inflation by influencing interest rates in the money 
market, government does not have to pay much attention to fiscal balances. Since 2008, 
the ECB interest rate has reached a zero level, so lowering it further to produce more 
stimulus has no longer been an option. Consequently, the ECB relied on unconventional 
policy tools such as large-scale asset purchases. However, an ultra-loose policy as a way 
of getting out from debt overhang can only ultimately help to increase private credit. In 
addition, the transmission mechanism remains unclear and might have various adverse 
effects
2
. 
A potential solution to these challenges would involve an aggressive fiscal 
consolidation and adoption of tax increases. These factors pose a serious challenge to 
                                                             
2 For detailed discussion see  Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Gambacorta, Hofmann and Peersman (2012).  
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the policymakers who have to make hard choices in setting fiscal policies that are 
responsible and realistic about the expenditure and tax levels appropriate to the 
country’s needs (Auerbach, 2017). Thus, detailed sustainability analysis is needed to 
achieve a feasible solution to the problems of fiscal imbalances.  
The economic literature on sustainability analysis and debt management has been 
expanding rapidly and distinguishes between two methods. First, non-stationary time 
series analysis, focused on the stochastic properties of the deficit inclusive of interest 
payments (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986) or the stock of debt (Wilcox, 1989). Estimation 
results imply that policy-makers in most EU countries have failed to keep fiscal 
discipline and balanced budgets. Alternative approach is focused on the long-run 
cointegrating relationship of expenditure and revenues (Trehan and Walsh (1988); 
Quintos (1995); Prohl and Schneider (2006); Berenguer-Rico and Carrion-i-Silvestere 
(2011)).  These studies concluded that the intertemporal budget constraint in European 
countries was overall complied. The lack of consensus between these approaches has 
motivated a further line of research that finds stronger evidence in favor of stationarity, 
cointegration and sustainability when allowance is made for the existence of structural 
breaks or non-linearities in the deficit series (see, Quintos (1995); Ricciuti (2003); 
Considine and Gallagher (2008); Chortareas, Kapetanios, and Uctum (2008)). 
The second strand of economic literature treats fiscal sustainability problem by means 
of fiscal policy reaction function (FPRF). It estimates the degree of the reaction of  
primary balance to changes in debt. However, not much consensus exists in the 
literature on the actual degree of anti-cyclical policy or consolidation in response to the 
debt ratio that euro area governments have historically pursued. Time-series estimates 
of a fiscal policy reaction function for the euro area in levels have generally indicated a 
weak degree of anti-cyclical policy, while estimates of a fiscal policy reaction function 
in first differences have indicated a stronger degree of anti-cyclical policy, more in line 
with results from the cyclical adjustment literature (Plödt and Reicher, 2014).  
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned results, we also want to stress a few 
shortcomings in the empirical literature, which offer room for further research and 
improvements. First of all, while trying to construct a robust fiscal policy reaction 
function with the strongest predictive power researchers usually try to use data from 
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countries where it is of the biggest length and highest quality, i.e. developed countries 
from G7 or EU 14 groups (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Quintos, 1995; Afonso, 2005; 
Bohn, 2008; Holmes, Otero and Panagiotidis, 2009; Camarero and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
and Tamarit, 2013). Transition countries like the ones from the CEE group have been 
often omitted due to data availability issues. However, it has been shown that emerging 
economies have lower tolerance for sovereign debt, with defaults at much lower levels 
of public debt to GDP (Reinhart, Savastano and Rogoff, 2003)
3
. In addition, comparing 
to developed countries like Portugal and Greece, which stuck with the high debt levels, 
CEE economies are not yet affected with the “debt tumor”. So, they can cure a disease 
in the early stage and become the source of economic growth of the EU. Thus, more 
emphasis should be put on the developing EU countries when conducting the 
sustainability analysis. 
The next issue is that most papers use the data that stops before the sovereign debt 
crisis. Most of the studies cover the period between 1995 and 2008, consequently they 
don’t consider all the countries that exceeded the fiscal fatigue thresholds. Finally, 
countries’ heterogeneities are not thoroughly looked at. Just as economies of developed 
and developing countries run in pretty different ways, so the banking distress periods 
differ in each of the country groups, which is reflected in their fiscal reaction functions. 
These differences are crucial because reduced reaction at high debt levels might be 
caused by heavily indebted countries that historically had weaker response to debt 
accumulation. This also explains why these countries are heavily indebted. 
Following the discussed motivation the aim of our research is to examine the 
sustainability of public finances in the group of Central and Eastern European countries 
by applying recent advances in non-stationary panel data methods and fiscal policy 
reaction function. Previous literature suggests that fiscal policy of Central and Eastern 
European faced various challenges during these decades
4
. Thus, we want to answer the 
question: does fiscal policy of the CEE countries lead to sustainable economic growth? 
                                                             
3 According to the IMF (2003), public debt was below 60% of GDP in every second sovereign default case recorded in emerging 
market economies in the past. 
4 Afonso, Nickel and Rother (2005) report that debt-to-GDP ratio in CEE countries was below the advanced European economies 
level, however was increasing at a much higher rate. Mihaljek (2009) showed that CEE countries financed their long expansion to a 
great extent by borrowing from foreign markets and given the scarcity of external sources of funding in the latest years, fiscal 
consolidation is strongly needed. 
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We break the question into two parts: i) what is the policy reaction to the debt increase; 
ii) is the fiscal policy countercyclical.  
 Regarding the time span and countries comprised, our work is closely connected to 
Eller and Urvova (2012), Baldi and Staehr (2012) and more recently Krajewski, 
Mackiewicz & Szymańska (2016), who estimate the fiscal reaction function for a panel 
of Central Eastern and Southeastern European countries. However, we extend our 
analysis by considering the most recent data available (1995-2015). In order to reconcile 
differences in the previous results, we carefully investigate the order of integration of 
main fiscal variables employing unit root tests that allow for structural breaks. On the 
next step we use follow the baseline case of Ghosh et. al. (2013) and estimate fiscal 
reaction functions with a set of different control variables to better understand the fiscal 
policy behaviour.  
Our results show that the primary balance in CEE countries is less persistent than in the 
developed ones. It appears to be extra reactive to increasing public debt (in a corrective 
manner) and to business cycle fluctuations (in a countercyclical manner) in line with the 
recent literature implying fiscal sustainability in CEE countries. After the crisis in 2008 
the fiscal response gets even more reactive to the debt, however, turning its behavior to 
acyclical. Next, we find evidence of the “fiscal fatigue” (positive but eventually slowing 
response of the primary balance to rising debt) during the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
We also come to a conclusion that unconventional monetary policy of the ECB harms 
fiscal discipline, which is reflected in the positive effect of the shadow policy rate on the 
primary balance. Finally, the change in fiscal response to interest payments, old 
dependency ratio and fiscal rule index variables points out the shift in priorities of the 
fiscal authorities as an aftermath of the crisis.  
Overall, our research contributes to the literature in the following ways: i) we consider 
both non-stationary time-series analysis with estimation parameters of fiscal reaction 
function for completeness and robustness purposes; ii) we take a longer time span and 
make use of uniform and comparable data; iii) in line with recent literature we test the 
hypothesis of “fiscal fatigue” in CEE economies; iv) finally, we experiment with several 
specifications of the fiscal reaction function to test related economic hypotheses. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature our research is built on. Section 3 discusses the alternative strategies for 
testing sustainability and econometric issues involved in estimating fiscal reaction 
functions. Section 4 describes the data used in the article and conducts stationarity 
analysis of the main fiscal variables. Section 5 reports the results of the fiscal reaction 
function of CEE countries. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses possible ways to 
improve the research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.  Fiscal sustainability indicators (FSI) 
Sustainability issue was brought into the nutshell, during the early 80s, following the oil 
crisis in 1970. Huge budget deficits almost doubled public debt in OECD countries, 
which jumped from 28 percent of GDP in 1960 to 50 percent in 1980. The result was a 
very extensive theoretical and empirical literature emerged on this topic (Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Blanchard et al. (1990), Ahmed and Rogers 
(1995)). 
Early findings ended up with a series of fiscal sustainability indicators. The most 
common  measures of government solvency were the primary gap and tax gap. The gap 
is defined as the difference between the current and some sustainable level of the 
primary deficit or the tax ratio
5
. Sustainable level was defined as one that ensures 
convergence of the debt ratio towards a finite value. A primary goal of sustainability 
indicators is signalling about excessive debt accumulation. They show how painful the 
adjustment would need to be to stabilise the debt. The major advantage of sustainability 
indicators is simplicity. That’s why they are often used for setting up fiscal targets and 
adapting public finances to future spending pressures such as those resulting from 
population ageing. However, there is a significant gap between the theory and the 
measures that policy makers use in practice for decision making (Krejdl, 2006).  
Chalk and Hemming (2000) argue that the benchmarks based on sustainability 
indicators rest on bias assessments and create the wrong incentives for urgent 
                                                             
5  For further details refer to Buiter (1985) and Blanchard et al. (1990) 
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adjustments and divert attention from alternative policy options, which would 
emphasize sustained growth. For instance, a positive fiscal gap neither means that the 
country's solvency is in danger, nor that adjustment is needed. This discrepancy has a 
considerable impact on the policy recommendations that follow from different 
assessments of fiscal sustainability. Moreover, indicators rest on assumptions about the 
maximum level of primary surpluses (debt). The main inputs for its calculation, interest 
and growth rates can change abruptly due to exogenous shocks. So, a debt level that 
appears sustainable under one set of assumptions might be insolvent if interest rates 
surge or the growth rate plunges (Barta, 2015). 
2.2. Non-stationary time series analysis 
Another scope of economic literature treats fiscal sustainability problem by the means 
of non-stationary time series. It deals both with the difficulty in forecasting interest and 
growth rates and with the uncertainty of the maximum level of primary surpluses. 
Evidence against unit roots has been considered  to support the strong form of 
sustainability consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint (Holmes, Otero, 
Panagiotidis, 2010). In practice, however, fiscal variables are rarely stationary in level. 
Single country analysis performed on debt series reports contradicting results. Trehan 
and Walsh (1988) find that the budget deficit in the United States follows a stationary 
stochastic process, while Wilcox (1989), Hamilton and Flavin (1986), and Hakkio and 
Rush (1991) fail to find evidence that the budget deficit in the US is stationary implying 
an unsustainable budgetary process. 
Another way to address this problem, proposed by Quintos (1995), Ahmed and Rogers 
(1995), is to explore the structural relationship between government expenditures and 
revenues. The existence of a cointegrating relationship has been considered as evidence 
consistent with the IBC and can be regarded as the “weak” form of budget sustainability 
(Holmes, Otero, Panagiotidis, 2010). However, researchers once again end up with 
puzzling and inconsistent results.  
Economists have tried to improve the robustness of short time series tests by applying 
panel data technique. Modern panel analyses of cointegration and stationarity have been 
implemented by Afonso and Rault (2010, 2015), Prohl and Schneider (2006), Holmes, 
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Otero and Panagiotidis (2009), Westerlund and Prohl (2010) and Camarero and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre and Tamarit (2013). Afonso and Rault (2007) emphasize that the 
main advantage of panel cointegration analysis is that it increases the power of the tests 
by including new observations from individual time series. In addition, cross-section 
information reduces the probability of a spurious regression. 
Unit root tests applied to panels can be divided in three groups: (i) first generation tests 
assuming cross-country independence among panel units except for common time 
effects (Maddala and Wu (1999); Levin, Lin, Chu (2002); Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003); 
Pesaran (2007); (ii) second generation panel unit root tests allowing for cross-country 
dependence (Moon and Perron (2004); Choi (2006)); (iii) panel unit root test allowing 
for structural breaks (Im, Lee, 2001) based on the Lagrange multiplier. 
In most cases panel tests consider a joint null hypothesis of a unit root against the 
alternative of at least one stationary series in the panel. However, Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) point out that one needs to be very careful interpreting the results. For example, 
in the case of mixed panel, when only some of the members are stationary, researchers 
often draw a much stronger conclusion about government debt series. The most that can 
be inferred is that at least one country is mean reverting or that stationarity holds only 
marginally for a few countries. 
Next point which received significant attention in empirical literature is the problem of 
structural breaks. Afonso and Rault (2007) and Chortareas, Kapetanios, and Uctum, 
(2008) show that combining structural breaks with panel data allows to improve the 
power of the unit root tests significantly. However, many economists argue that there is 
little evidence that a structural break, if present, occurred in all countries at the same 
time. Hence, there is more sense to study structural breaks on the individual level. 
The main shortcoming of the panel unit root tests is that they typically require relatively 
long time series that are rarely available. Application of short time span could partly 
explain inconclusive results of early studies. Afonso (2005) illustrates the small sample 
problem for a comprehensive set of countries based on cointegration tests. Additionally, 
unit root tests perform poorly, when fiscal policy is on the “border”. In practice many 
variables or their combinations are borderline cases, so that distinguishing between a 
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strongly autoregressive I(0) or I(1) process (interest rates are a typical example), or 
between a strongly autoregressive I(1) or I(2) process is far from easy (Afonso, Rault, 
2007). Next, the empirical conclusions stemming from the analysis of a heterogeneous 
group of countries are vague and often have little economic content. In this respect 
Afonso and Jalles (2008) note that if we wrongly assume cross-sectional independence 
among the units in the panel then the null hypothesis of panel stationarity is clearly 
rejected.  Finally, argued by Bohn (1998, 2008), the basic time series test does not fully 
exploit uncertainty around fiscal sustainability. Applied to the US debt series during 
1916-1995, Bohn showed that conventional univariate analysis fails to reject 
sustainability hypothesis. As later would be emphasized stationarity of public debt is 
only a sufficient condition in assessment of fiscal sustainability. Bohn claims that a 
better solution would be to analyze the government’s reaction  to changes in public 
debt, e.g. reducing the deficit or increasing the surplus. This approach is often referred 
as the fiscal policy reaction function.  
Despite the big skepticism around conventional unit root tests, one must note that order 
of integration of fiscal series still plays a crucial role in sustainability analysis. It defines 
how fast country will fulfil the IBC condition (Quintos, 1995). A high order of 
integration is associated with higher macroeconomic risks of insolvency. From a 
technical point of view, the assessment of order of integration is required in order to 
build more complicated time series model.  
2.3. Fiscal policy reaction function 
The rest of studies are built on the framework of fiscal reaction functions proposed by 
Bohn (1998). The main purpose of FPRF is to describe the automatic and discretionary 
reaction of the fiscal authorities to debt accumulation. The idea behind the FPRF is that 
the fiscal policy is sustainable as long as the primary surplus reacts sufficiently strongly 
to changes in debt to make sure that debt growth is bounded in the long run (Bohn 1998, 
2008).  
The fiscal policy reaction function is considered as a more flexible approach to 
assessing fiscal sustainability. Unlike conventional unit root tests, it gives insights into 
the magnitude and the lag of the government’s reaction to public debt shocks. Fiscal 
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reaction function reveals the government’s ability to generate a primary surplus in the 
short term in order to meet the constraints imposed by the IBC in the long run (Stoian 
and Campeanu, 2010). This condition is usually tested by estimating a regression of 
primary balance on lagged debt series. In case of a linear relationship, a positive and 
statistically significant debt coefficient would mean that country is committed to reduce 
or maintain steady debt-to-GDP ratios conditional on a set of other factors (Checherita-
Westphal and Ždarek, 2017). Previous literature finds that in advanced economies 
governments usually meet fiscal sustainability constraints. The coefficient of the debt-
to-GDP ratio is commonly between 0.01 and 0.10 (Table 1). This means that a marginal 
increase in gross government debt (1 p.p.) leads to approximately 0.01 - 0.1 p.p. fiscal 
tightening in primary balance in the next year. For a detailed review of FPRF literature 
see Table 2.1 in Appendix 2. 
Recent fiscal policy reaction research has focused on the studying of nonlinear behavior 
of the debt dynamics. In this context, the hypothesis of fiscal fatigue has been tested. 
Generally, studies applied to large panels of advanced economies point the presence of 
so-called “fiscal fatigue”.  This phenomenon means that at very high level of the debt 
ratio, the fiscal effort becomes too large to increase with the same speed (Ghosh et al, 
2011,2013; Everaert and Jansen, 2017). For instance, Ghosh et al. (2013) provide 
evidence of fiscal fatigue by considering the cubic specification of FPRF for a group of 
23 advanced economies over the period 1970–2007. The results of estimations suggest 
that the responsiveness of fiscal policy starts to decrease at the debt level of 90-100% of 
GDP and becomes negative when the debt level approaches the threshold of 150% of 
GDP.
6
 The authors explain the phenomenon of "fiscal fatigue" by the disability of the 
government to increase primary balances with the same pace as the debt goes up. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6
 This conclusion is contrary to the results of Bohn (1998) according to which the fiscal reaction increases 
with increasing debt. 
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Table 1. Summary of fiscal policy reaction function literature 
Study Sample 
Estimate of 
debt coef. 
Study Sample 
Estimate of 
debt coef. 
Bohn (1998) US ,1916-1995 0.054 
Afonso and Jalles 
(2011) 
18 OECD, 1970–2010 -0.05–0.17 
Debrun and Wyplosz 
(1999) 
EU-11, 1982–1997 0.01-0.03 EC (2011) 
EU-27, 
1975/1980–2010 
0.033 – 
0.038 
Galí and Perotti 
(2003) 
EU-11 and OECD-
5 1980–2002 
-0.07 (EU-11) 
-0.02 
(OECD5) 
Ghosh et al. 
(2011) 
23 DMs, 1970/1985–
2007 
-0.2080 
IMF (2003) 
54 EMs and DMs, 
1990–2002 
0.039–0.047 
Eller and Urvová 
(2012) 
EU-8, 1995–2011 0.026–0.060 
IMF (2004) EA-12, 1971–2003 0-0.08 
Escolano et al. 
(2012) 
EU-27, 1990–2008 0.0367 
Abiad and Baig 
(2005) 
34 EMs, 1990–
2002 
 
0.048–0.072 
Medeiros (2012) EU-27/-21, 1976–2011 0.054–0.078 
Abiad and Ostry 
(2005) 
31 EMs, 1990–
2002 
0.04–0.06 
Theofilakou, 
Stournaras (2012) 
10 EA, 1988–2009 
0.0240–
0.0426; 
Annett (2006) EU-14 ,1980–2004 0.01–0.03 
Betty and 
Shiamptanis 
(2013) 
11 EA, 1970–2011, 
pre-EMU (1970–1998) 
and post-EMU (1999-
2011) 
0.0727 
Celasun et al. (2006) 
34 EMs,1990–
2004 
0.030–0.046 
Debrun and Kinda 
(2013) 
28 EMs and 26 DMs, 
1980–2010 
0.032–0.037 
Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2006) 
19 OECD, 1988–
2006 
0.008–0.024 
Ghosh et al. 
(2013) 
23 DMs, 1970/1985– 
2007 
-0.208– -
0.225 
Ayuso-i-Casals et al. 
(2007) 
EU-22, 1990–2005 -0.18– -0.02 
Legrenzi and 
Milas (2013) 
Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, 
1960(1970)–2012 
0.087–0.177 
Bohn (2008) US,1792–2003 0.094 – 0.121 Cuerpo (2014) Spain, 1986q1–2012q4 
-0.032 – 
0.018 
Debrun et al. (2008) EU-25, 1990–2005 0.02-0.04 
Debrun and Kinda 
(2014) 
28 EMs  and 26 DMs,  
1990–2011 
0.015–0.023 
Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2008) 
11 EA, 1978–2006 0.009–0.014 Schoder (2014) 15 OECD, 1981–2010 
0.041 (1980–
1996) 
0.011 (1997–
2010) 
Mendoza and Ostry 
(2008) 
22 DMs and 34 
EMs 1980/1990–
2005 
0.033–0.072 
Weichenrieder and 
Zimmer (2014) 
EA, 1970–2011 0.043-0.059 
*  EM – Emerging Markets, DM – Developed Markets, EU –European Union, EA – Euro Area, OECD – 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Source: Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek (2017) 
Medeiros (2012) reports similar results for EU countries, with fiscal fatigue thresholds  
between 80 and 90% of GDP. On the other hand, EC (2011) tests for non-linear debt 
effects (quadratic and cubic terms) on cyclicaly adjusted primary balance for a panel of 
EU countries over the period 1975/1980 – 2010 and does not find significant supporting 
evidence.  
 17 
There is little evidence on the fiscal sustainability of emerging Euro area countries 
mainly due to limited data. Abiad and Ostry (2005) was among the first studies, which 
explicitly focused on the emerging EU countries. The authors emphasize that along with 
the advanced countries, the increase above the threshold levels of the debt diminishes 
the responsiveness to debt in emerging market countries. In fact, the authors argue that 
the ability of policy makers to maintain fiscal solvency through higher primary balances 
with debt ratios above 50-60 % range appears to wane.  
Mendoza and Ostry (2008) study how the degree of fiscal policy responsiveness varies 
between industrial and emerging market countries. Obtained estimates of debt 
parameter are 0.02 for advanced economies and 0.036 for both emerging economies and 
the combined panel. As Mendoza and Ostry (2008) concluded, this higher debt 
coefficient is not an indicator of “more sustainable” fiscal policies in emerging 
economies, but a simple evidence that past increases in debt of a given magnitude in 
these countries require a stronger conditional response of the primary balance, and 
hence less reliance on debt markets, than in advanced economies. In contrast to the 
previous studies, Mendoza and Ostry didn’t find that the responsiveness to debt 
increases, when the debt exceeds threshold levels in panel of advanced countries, but it 
does diminish for emerging market economies. 
The recent study of Baldi and Staehr (2013) considers the differences in fiscal reaction 
of developed and developing European countries. Overall, the primary balance in both 
groups shows the same persistence and cyclical reaction, however the responsiveness to 
debt ratio was much higher in advanced Northern European states. The authors relate 
reduced  reaction of CEE economies to debt accumulation to generally low public debt.  
Finally, the most recently Krajewski, Mackiewicz and Szymańska (2016) together with 
Eller and Urvová (2012) found evidence that primary balance in the CESEE countries 
under consideration is highly persistent and responds in a corrective manner to 
increasing public debt and in a countercyclical manner to business cycle fluctuations (in 
line with Staehr, 2008). Moreover Krajewski, Mackiewicz and Szymańska (2016) found 
evidence of non-linear relationship between primary balance and lagged debt, with 
fiscal fatigue occurrence at the 70% threshold. Eventually, they provide evidence that 
response of primary balance to lagged debt and output gap is not homogenous across 
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countries and time period in the sample, as well as that it also depends on the exchange 
rate regime. 
Additionally, fiscal policy reaction literature studies the response of the fiscal policy to 
the GDP fluctuations. The usual finding is that in the emerging economies, fiscal policy 
is procyclical or neutral. IMF (2015) states that developing countries are characterized 
by asymmetry in the fiscal policy response to the business cycle meaning that during 
recessions the policy is countercyclical while during the economic growth – procyclical.  
Symmetrycal reaction to business cycle is important for three following reasons: (i) 
building buffers to sustain cyclical downturns; (ii) decreasing the risk of overheating; 
(iii) and avoiding debt accumulation over successive cycles. For emerging markets, 
good times often mean easier access to financing providing an opportunity to satisfy the 
key priorities of economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, the asymmetric 
response of fiscal policy throughout the economic cycle bears threats to the debt 
sustainability (Vdovychenko, 2016). 
3. Methodology 
In this section we derive the baseline fiscal reaction function used in our analysis. We 
start by looking at the different functional forms used in the literature to describe the 
relationship between the primary balance and government debt. Finally, we end the 
section by considering the econometric issues of estimating fiscal policy reaction 
functions using panel data technique, in particular, endogeneity of lagged debt and the 
output gap to the unobserved shocks to the primary surplus. 
3.1.  Alternative strategies of testing sustainability 
We start with the conventional baseline linear model of Bohn (1998, 2008): 
                (1) 
where    – primary budget balance to nominal GDP ratio,     – public debt to nominal 
GDP ratio,    – a vector of control variables, which typically include proxies for 
temporary fluctuations in output and government expenditures, and    is an iid error 
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term. In case of a linear relationship a positive and significant debt coefficient (β > 0) 
would mean that government commits to reduce or maintain steady debt-to-GDP ratios. 
While the basic specification of FPRFs is relatively straightforward, a great attention 
has been put in the literature on accurately specifying the possible differences in 
reaction of the primary balance at different debt levels. Initially specified as simple 
linear functions of debt, FPRF has been frequently estimated using nonlinear 
specifications, either by including exogenous debt thresholds (Lukkezen and Rojas-
Romagosa, 2013, 2012; Celasun et al, 2007) or by using polynomial functions (either 
quadratic or cubic; Gosh et al, 2013, 2011; Medeiros, 2012; Bohn, 2005). For instance, 
Ghosh et al. (2013) suggested following non-linear debt function: 
                
 
        
 
              (2) 
Such specification aim to capture threshold level, beyond which fiscal responsiveness 
would increase (lower bound) or decrease (upper bound).  The positive, but eventually 
slowing response (     or      and     ) of the primary balance to rising debt 
corresponds to the issue of “fiscal fatigue” in budgetary adjustment process, i.e. at high 
levels of public debt government tends to increase primary balance more slowly in order 
to preserve debt sustainability. 
Similar to Ghosh et al. (2013) and other recent works, our empirical model also 
explores nonlinearites in government debt – primary balance relation: 
                               
                     ,    (3) 
where      is the variable measuring primary balance in terms of GDP,        is the 
lagged debt-to-GDP ratio,   is the regression coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable (primary balance) and     is a vector containing various (macro)economic, 
institutional and political determinants of primary balance,     are country fixed effects 
and     is the error term. The highly politicized nature of government budgeting makes 
it hard to react immediately to changes in debt and other economic conditions. To allow 
for sluggishness in the response of fiscal policy, we add the lagged primary balance 
        to the explanatory variables. 
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3.2. Model specification 
For the dependent variable one of the two main policy variables are used in the 
literature: cyclical adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and primary balance. The former is 
used to estimate pure “fiscal effort“, while the latter is more related to the output gap 
and shows the overall fiscal policy behavior. We choose primary balance as a dependent 
variable in our model, since it is the “observable” fiscal policy variable, it is less prone 
to ex-post revisions, and it is used in most previous studies (Checherita-Westphal and 
Žďárek, 2017). 
Along with the study of statistical characteristics of debt and budget parameters, a 
number of control variables were included to the FPRF to test additional hypotheses. 
Previous literature considers control variables of economic (like oil prices, CPI 
inflation, openness) and institutional nature (like index of institutional quality, 
commitment to IMF programs, fiscal rules index, election indicators).  
Given that the GDP gap contains information on prices and economic growth, this 
measure is often introduced into FPRF in order to take into account the output 
stabilization (Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Clayes, 2008). If the primary balance was 
related positively to the output gap, favorable economic developments would improve 
the budgetary position of a country (e.g. via boom-induced revenue windfalls) – 
indicating a countercyclical fiscal response. By contrast, a negative coefficient would 
indicate a procyclical, and an insignificant coefficient an acyclical fiscal response. 
Output stabilisation is usually seen as a more important goal of fiscal policy for 
countries in a monetary union, where it is the only tool available to deal with country-
specific shocks. However, the lifetime budget constraint can be satisfied not only by 
means of fiscal instruments, but also  by generating a lot of seigniorage revenue. That is 
why the monetary indicators, like the interest rate, inflation or the income from 
seigniorage are also often included into the FPRF to account for the impact of the 
monetary policy (Budina and Wijnbergen, 2008).  
Another important variable frequently included in FPRF is the current account (CA). 
The reasoning is related to the twin-deficit hypothesis which states that a fiscal deficit 
(due to e.g. a tax reduction) may lead to an income boost and hence a current account 
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deterioration. Including CA variable in the fiscal reaction function researchers usually 
simultaneously test the twin-deficit hypothesis with their model (Checherita-Westphal 
and Ždarek, 2017). 
Recent developments in the EU related to the financial and sovereign debt crisis call for 
additionally controlling for some other factors. The intensity of the crisis has affected 
the relationship between public revenues (and spending) and GDP, with a strong 
increase in short-term fiscal multipliers. In order to catch the financial distress effect on 
the fiscal policy, a crisis dummy is usually introduced in the specification. Several 
papers use more recent data to investigate the issue of whether governments' primary 
balances have become more responsive to debt since the onset of the 2008 financial 
crisis (Baldi and Staehr, 2015; Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek, 2015). 
The next variable of interest is the interest payments to GDP ratio. Debrun and 
Kinda (2013) found that a higher share of government revenue absorbed by interest 
payments tends to trigger a positive response of the primary balance beyond what is 
needed to achieve solvency, which they call the ‘squeezing feeling’. The intuition is that 
governments set a specific target in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio, forcing the actual 
primary balance to move synchronously with its debt-stabilizing level. Another 
interpretation is that even being subject to extreme myopia, optimizing governments 
don’t tolerate the crowding-out of socially useful expenditure by rising debt service. 
As many countries incorporated some variants of fiscal rules in their policy it’s also 
useful to investigate their effect on the primary balance. Tkačevs and Vilerts (2016) in 
their paper make use of the fiscal rule index (FRI) developed by Maltritz and Wuste 
(2015) to check the response of the fiscal policy to the degree of regulations followed. 
The intuition is that the stronger regulations usually help to keep the budget balanced 
leading to the debt sustainability. On the other side, overregulation could harm during 
the times when quick and flexible actions are required, such as during the crisis. 
Another issue often discussed together with the budget balancing is implicit budget 
liabilities. Countries with a higher proportion of the old age population should account 
for it in their budget by saving more funds to cover the liabilities to next generation 
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citizens. This relation is usually included in FPRFs in the form of the old age 
dependency ratio (Ghosh et al., 2011; Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek, 2017). 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests the significant effect of the political 
cycles on the fiscal policy outcome (Nordhaus, 1975, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 
1997). The governments are willing to provide more expansionary fiscal policy in the 
pre-election time period. Its impact could be captured by including the election dummy 
variable into the FPRF specification.  
Recent point of discussion is that ultra-loose monetary policy brought a noticeable 
increase in government borrowings, delaying the implementation of structural reforms. 
Tkačevs and Vilerts (2016) show that declining borrowing costs seem to affect budget 
behavior of fiscal policymakers by inducing them to run higher budget deficits. The 
authors report that this effect is particularly strong in the euro area countries, where 
interest rates has been significantly lower comparing to other countries. Hence, one 
point of interest would be to study the effect of the unconventional measures on the 
fiscal policy stance. Wu and Xia (2014) propose to measure the unconventional 
monetary policy with the shadow policy rate. It shows what the interest rate would be if 
it could go below zero.  
We conclude the above discussion defining the final set of control variables for our 
FPRF: 
 GDP gap as a proxy of the business cycle in line with most previous papers 
(Debrun and Kinda (2013), Westphal and Ždarek (2017), Tkacevs and Vilerts (2016)); 
 Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) as an indicator of the monetary 
policy in line with Tkacevs and Vilerts (2016); 
 CA as a reflection of the twin-deficit hypothesis in line with Checherita-Westphal 
and Ždarek (2017); 
 Financial crisis dummy variable as a proxy for financial distress in line with 
Debrun and Kinda (2013). Following their approach we take the variable from Laeven 
and Valencia (2012) crisis database; 
 Interest payments to GDP ratio as an indicator of the ‘squeezing feeling’ of fiscal 
authorities in line with Debrun and Kinda (2013); 
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 Old age dependency ratio as a reflection of implicit budget liabilities in line with 
Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek (2015); 
 Fiscal rule index as a proxy of degree of fiscal regulations in line with Maltritz and 
Wuste (2015), Tkacevs and Vilerts (2016); 
 Shadow policy rate as a proxy of the unconventional monetary policy in line with 
Wu and Xia (2017); 
 Election dummy as an index of political cycle in line with Tkacevs and Vilerts 
(2016);  
 
3.3. Econometric issues 
Estimation of the fiscal reaction function encounters three possible issues: 
heterogeneity, time-variation and endogeneity. Ignoring these can lead to biased 
estimation of regression parameters if pooled estimators are used. 
Fiscal reaction function relies on the implicit assumption that the coefficient   which 
respresents the effect of the lagged public debt on the primary balance (equation 3) is 
common across countries. This can be a strong assumption as the countries differ 
considerably in their ability to generate primary surpluses, history of their economic 
policies and the macroeconomic volatility they display. This issue is generally 
overcome by using fixed effects method of econometric estimation that includes a sole 
dummy variable for each country in the sample to capture country-specific effects    . 
Global trends and common shocks can cause cross-sectional dependence and are 
potentially also a source of persistence. Serial correlation between        and      would 
result in a negative correlation between        and     . One of the possible options to 
account for these shocks is by considering time fixed effects. However, a set-up like this 
assumes the same effect of a shock on each country considered. This is a rather 
restrictive assumption. Probably a more reasonable solution is to include a lagged 
endogenous variable on the right-hand side of the fiscal reaction function in order to 
control for autocorrelation.  
Medeiros (2012) points out three potential sources of endogeneity in the fiscal reaction 
function: (i) correlation of the output gap with the fiscal policy shock (a fiscal multiplier 
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effect),  (ii) dependence of lagged debt on past values of the primary balance (a reverse 
causality issue) and (iii) persistence of errors, making lagged debt endogenous. The 
endogeneity of primary balance arises from the fact that past values of primary balance 
partly determine the current state of      . Since the current debt-to-GDP ratio is 
determined by the lagged primary surpluses,        at its turn determines       , which 
makes        endogenous. 
Persistence of errors is even more important in the case of panel data analysis, where a 
common fiscal reaction is assumed; in case of error correction model, where variables 
are considered in first differences, this source of endogeneity should be reduced – see 
Medeiros (2012). It results in a highly persistent primary balance as fiscal authorities 
can’t react immediately to macroeconomic changes. Since the residuals are 
autocorrelated, countries with historically higher primary balances will have a lower 
debt ratio. Thus, the negative relation between debt and the errors will result in a 
downward bias of the estimated coefficient of debt. In order to address the bias, 
scientists allow for serial correlation in the error terms (               ). Ostry et al., 
2010 and Ghosh et al., 2013 deal with this issue by using the (iterated) Prais-Winsten 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimator. 
Previous research usually addresses potential endogeneity issues by applying proper 
instrumentation to the variables that are exogenous to the primary balance shocks. 
However, reliable instrumental variables (IV) based estimations require the use of 
suitable instruments that are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors. Such 
ideal instruments are often not easy to find. Moreover, IV method might still result in 
the downward biased estimates of the debt coefficient.  
One of the methods of consistent-estimation in dynamic panels is GMM of Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It involves first-differencing equation (3) 
and using lagged levels of endogenous variables as instruments in a GMM regression. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that estimating a system that includes both the first-
difference and the level equations and instruments endogenous variables with their 
lagged levels and first-differences greatly increases the efficiency of the estimations. 
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There are however some drawbacks to this approach. First, in the GMM setting, the 
minimal number of required instruments turns out to be large relative to the number of 
observations and can lead to over-fitting of the model. Roodman (2009) stressed that 
instrument proliferation can result in the overfitting of endogenous variables, fail to 
expunge their endogenous components and weaken the power of the Hansen instrument 
validity test (a telltale sign is the perfect Hansen p-value of 1.0). In addition, in case of 
weak instruments GMM estimator has weak properties in comparison with simple 
estimation methods. Finally, Judson and Owen (1999) and more recently Eller and 
Urvova (2012) provide arguments about the limited power of GMM estimator when the 
number of independent variables is large compared to the number of observations as in 
our case. 
Considering all the flaws and complications of the two approaches discussed above we 
leave FE-IV and GMM for the robustness check. As the instruments we use the set of 
variables most commonly used in the literature. In particular, our set of instrumental 
variables includes second lag of debt, lagged output gap, lagged current account, trade-
to-GDP ratio, US GDP growth rate, Russia GDP growth rate, oil price growth, non-fuel 
price, US short-term interest rate and potential GDP for each country. The validity of 
instruments is checked with the Sargan test. 
We choose the FE estimator with GLS weights as our preferred option to obtain the 
estimates for equation (3). One drawback of this approach is the downward “Nickell’s 
bias” that appears in samples where the time dimension T is small. However, Judson 
and Owen (1999) claim that the bias can be sizeable even when T = 20 (which is exactly 
the case of our sample). Furthermore, Blundell & Bond (1998) note that FE estimators 
perform better when the dependent variable is moderately persistent. As was stated in 
Roodman (2009), reliable estimates of the true parameter are in the “credible” range 
between pooled OLS and the panel fixed effects estimator. If one considers a 95% 
confidence interval around the estimates, the pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimator 
can’t really be distinguished from each other. Consequently, at least in statistical terms, 
the bias due to endogeneity in our case should be limited. Finally, our panel is greater in 
the time dimension compared to the cross-section dimension, thus, limiting the potential 
bias.  
 26 
4. Data 
We examine the sustainability of the public debt and the budget deficit in the panel of 
10 Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1995- 2016. The sample 
used in our analysis includes former transition countries and current European Union 
Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, in the following referred collectively to as CEE-
10.  
All macroeconomic variables are taken in annual frequency and defined in relation to 
GDP. Even though there are examples of using higher frequency data in the literature, 
we follow the conventional approach based on annual data since fiscal data at a higher 
frequency is considered to be less meaningful. First of all, annual data matches well 
with the budget process. Secondly, quarterly data is rather noisy, include seasonal 
movements in economic activities. 
The sources of the data are given in the Appendix 3, Table 3.1. The main source is 
European Commission AMECO annual database. As was noted by Afonso (2012, 2015) 
uniform methodology plays crucial role in panel analysis. It allows reliable cross 
country comparisons and consistency in the estimation results. Table 4.1 in Appendix 4 
displays descriptive statistics for the fiscal series for CEE countries.  
The assessment of the order of integration of the main fiscal series is important 
provided that this step is required in order to estimate robust fiscal reaction function that 
links them. The visual analysis of the data suggests that except for the debt ratio 
variables are close to a stationary process with transitive shocks (Appendix 4, Figure 
4.1). The debt variable demonstrates non stationary behavior with the structural break in 
the 2008, after which we can observe not only a level shift but also a trend change. For 
deeper insight into the public finances in CEE countries, see Appendix 5. 
Table 6.1-6.2 in Appendix 6 reports results of Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) and Ng-
Perron (NP) (1989) unit root tests supplemented by the Kwiatkowsky, Phillips, Schmidt 
and Shin (KPSS) (1992) stationarity test. For ADF test automatic lag length selection 
was used based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8. The 
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NP and KPSS tests are based on Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and 
Bartlett  kernel. All tests were conducted with the assumption of both trend and 
intercept stationarity. 
Conventional unit root tests suggest that public debt series are non-stationary in the 
level.  NP test reports presence of a unit root in debt series for all investigated countries. 
ADF and KPSS show that at the standard five percent level of significance only for 
Slovakia, suggesting its debt series are close to stationary processes. As for primary 
balance the presence of unit root has been rejected for five countries, namely Lithuania, 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, suggesting that they are stationary in the level.  
As was pointed out by Perron (1989) and Lee and Strazicich (2003) conventional unit 
root tests can lead to misleading conclusions if the presence of structural breaks is 
ignored. The results would be heavily biased towards the non-rejection of a unit root. 
Thus, we proceed our analysis by computing the unit root test statistics in Zivot and 
Andrews (ZA) (1992)
7
 .  
The results of the break-point unit root tests, along with the estimated break points are 
reported in Tables 6.3-6.4 in Appendix 6. According to the results public debt series 
exhibited structural breaks with changes in the constant and trend. The unit root 
hypothesis can be rejected for seven countries, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. In most of the cases the break points 
appear in the 2008-2010, just after the global financial crisis, when a country faced 
problem with  foreign borrowing. Concerning primary balance, the hypothesis of a unit 
root is rejected in almost all cases in favour of the stationarity of the fiscal balances 
(apart from Poland and Bulgaria). As in case of debt series the break points occur right 
after the financial crisis. 
                                                             
7
 The test is based on a regression equation with the assumption of two types of dummy variables. The 
variables are related to the mean shift occurring at each possible break-date and the shift occurring at 
trend. The null hypothesis of the test implies that the time series under consideration contains a unit root 
with a drift without any structural break. An alternative hypothesis of the test implies that analysed time 
series generates a trendstationary process with one time break that occurs at an unknown time. 
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The Zivot and Andrews (1992) test was further extended with Lumsdaine and Papell 
(LP) (1997)
8
 unit root tests, allowing up to two breaks in trend and intercept. The results 
of the test are reported in Tables 6.3–6.4 in Appendix 6. By allowing for two structural 
breaks in primary balance it is possible to reject the unit root null hypothesis at the five 
percent level of significance for nine out of ten CEE countries (in line with Cuestas and 
Staehr (2013)). The exception is Lithuania. Debt to GDP ratio also turns out to be 
stationary, when we consider two structural breaks (except for the Czech Republic). In 
many cases the first break appears between 2000 and 2004, when the countries 
generally experienced rapid economic growth and extensive trade flows in anticipation 
of  joining the EU, while the second structural break as before corresponds to the global 
financial crisis.  Interestingly, we also see structural breaks in primary balance variables 
of CEE countries when the strong fiscal tightening took place in 2012-2013. Results oof 
panel unit root test presented in Table 7.1-7.2 in Appendix 7. 
Overall, the individual unit root analysis presents evidence that the public debt and 
primary balance are stationary when structural breaks are incorporated, leading us to 
conclude that the solvency condition would be satisfied for CEE-10 countries. 
Moreover, as was pointed out by break point tests, the Great Recession in 2008 caused a 
significant structural change in the long run path of the fiscal series. In the further 
sections we also want to check whether the debt coefficient in fiscal policy reaction 
function has changed since the onset of the recent economic crisis. For this purpose, we 
estimate FPRF using two sub-periods:  before (1995-2008) and after the crisis (2008-
2015). 
5. Results and discussion 
The results are shown in the Table 2. We deal with period effect since the big scope of 
literature has documented the different response of primary balance to some variables 
over time. We estimate the basic specification for two sub-periods 1995-2008 and 2008-
2015, in order to find how the recession has weakened the responsiveness of fiscal 
policy to the level of sovereign debt compared to the period prior to the crisis. 
                                                             
8 The test is based on extended equation of the sequential trend break model of Zivot and Andrews (1992). 
If the null hypothesis of the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) test is rejected, this means that the analysed 
time series is interpreted as a broken trend stationary with two breaks. 
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Tables 8.1-8.2 in Appendix 8 present the results for the two sub-periods. It’s worth 
noting that obtained results have to be treated with caution, as we also lose a 
considerable number of degrees of freedom. 
Our starting point is a benchmark regression which includes current account, lagged 
primary balance, lagged government debt to GDP ratio together with debt-to-GDP ratio 
squared output gap, HICP index and financial crisis dummy variable (see Table 1, 
column 1). Our results suggest that the lagged primary balance coefficient is positive 
and significant across various specifications in the full period sample and crisis sample, 
pointing to a robust persistency of the primary balance. However, contrary to the 
previous literature our model shows that the primary balance lacks persistence during 
the pre-crisis period. The coefficient estimate varies between 0.35 and 0.4 in the full 
period sample, implying that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of primary 
balance to GDP at t-1 will lead to a 0.35-0.4 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the ratio 
of primary balance to GDP at time t. This persistence might reflect the political nature 
of budgetary processes, which make the fiscal instrument to react gradually to its target 
(Claeys 2006). The coefficient estimate for the crisis sample shows slightly less 
persistence of 0.31-0.37.  
As for lagged debt, it is insignificant in the pre-crisis period models, but turns to be 
highly significant in all the regressions for the crisis sample, showing that countries 
started to show some budget responsiveness after the crisis, tightening their budgets 
when their debt is on an increasing trend. One can notice that the debt coefficients in the 
crisis models (around 0.17) increased two or even three times compared to the ones in 
the pre-crisis (around 0.06) models. If debt-to-GDP ratio increases by 1 p. p. primary 
balance goes up by about 0.17 pp after controlling for other relevant factors.  
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Table 2. Fiscal policy reaction function: GLS coefficient estimates, CEE-10, 1995-2016 
 
 
Note: The models include fixed effects dummies and are estimated using GLS cross-section weights and White cross-section coefficient-covariance method. Model 1 
is the baseline model, while models 2 to 6 are extensions to the baseline. P-values are given in the parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: variable is statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation. 
 
Dependent variable :      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
0.363*** 
(0.0716) 
0.361*** 
(0.0706) 
0.3436*** 
(0.0697) 
0.3252*** 
(0.0654) 
0.408*** 
(0.0611) 
0.3568*** 
(0.0705) 
       
0.0926*** 
(0.035) 
0.07 
(0.04996) 
0.078** 
(0.0365) 
0.0784** 
(0.0325) 
0.0957** 
(0.0383) 
0.0944*** 
(0.0345) 
        
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-7.87E-05 
(0.0004) 
-5.85E-05 
(0.0004) 
5.16E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
      
0.2233*** 
(0.0411) 
0.2375*** 
(0.0437) 
0.2187*** 
(0.0389) 
0.207*** 
(0.035) 
0.2415*** 
(0.0343) 
0.2234*** 
(0.0426) 
       
-0.0217*** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0092 
(0.0156) 
-0.0426** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0324*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0125 
(0.0313) 
-0.0211** 
(0.0084) 
     
-0.0081 
(0.0284) 
-0.01436 
(0.0272) 
-0.0155 
(0.0268) 
-0.02876 
(0.0282) 
-0.0219 
(0.0157) 
-0.0092 
(0.0284) 
       
0.4059 
(0.3834) 
    
        
0.221 
(0.1586) 
   
         
0.4775** 
(0.2217) 
  
ump     
0.1984 
(0.1828) 
 
             
-0.2676 
(0.2866) 
      
2.629** 
(1.0577) 
2.6894** 
(1.0699) 
2.5318*** 
(0.8893) 
2.5107*** 
(0.8693) 
2.0764*** 
(0.5703) 
2.5963** 
(1.098) 
Const 
-1.8301** 
(0.8039) 
-3.0169*** 
(1.1471) 
-4.964** 
(2.2417) 
-1.0736 
(0.8352) 
-6.3833** 
(3.1284) 
-1.8157** 
(0.8063) 
No. of observations   166 166 166 166 120 166 
R‐squared 0.6164 0.616 0.6181 0.6263 0.6748 0.6179 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8463 1.8487 1.8507 1.8612 2.091 1.8328 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test 4.7906*** 4.7688*** 3.5694*** 4.4845*** 5.6475*** 4.8285*** 
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Lagged debt squared is statistically insignificant variable with negative sign of the 
coefficient estimated in the full, pre-crisis and some of crisis period sample models. 
However, for the most crisis period models it becomes marginally significant, which 
can represent some evidence of the “fiscal fatigue” issue in budgetary adjustment 
process in the recent years. Apparently, CEE countries start to show fiscal behavior 
similar to the one of advanced economies (where the responsiveness is stronger once 
debt surpassed some threshold as a percentage of GDP, see IMF, 2003), which is in 
contrary to previous research (Abiad and Ostry, 2005, or IMF, 2003).  
Furthermore, in the pre-crisis and full period sample models fiscal policy appears to be 
extra reactive to cyclical developments. The coefficient estimate of the output gap 
remains positive and very significant in all specifications, with its magnitude remaining 
around 0.16 and 0.2 respectively. On the other hand, the coefficient becomes low and 
insignificant for the crisis period sample models. Thus, while the primary balance 
behaves in a countercyclical manner in the pre-crisis period (in line with the previous 
studies), it seems to turn to an acyclical behavior during the crisis. Since the full period 
sample shows even stronger evidence of the countercyclical behavior, our conclusion 
might be reasonably criticized in a way that the in-crisis period model results can’t be 
trusted because their data sample is too short. However, we still consider it as a 
potential issue that needs some further research to be conducted on. 
One should note that current account balance turns out to be insignificant in the model 
for the full period sample and significantly negative in the models for both partial 
period samples. This evidence underpins the previous studies that find that the twin 
deficit hypothesis fails for the CEE countries as opposed to developed countries. HICP 
has a negative effect on the primary balance in pre-crisis and full period sample models. 
The reason is that the higher inflation is expected to reduce the real value of 
accumulated debt, thus making policy-makers believe that they can increase budget 
deficit. During the crisis period, however, this relation turns to significantly positive 
meaning that being at a different stage of the business cycle affects the incentives of the 
authorities making them behave in the opposite way. 
A surprising result is that the financial crisis dummy has a highly significant positive 
effect of around 2.6 on the primary balance meaning that during the crises the primary 
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balance is 2.6 pp higher than in the other periods. It’s not consistent with the previous 
research. For instance, Debrun and Kinda (2013) use the same crisis dummy variable 
for a wider sample of emerging market countries and obtain coefficient estimates 
around -0.17. It means that this kind of relation pertains to the CEE countries only. The 
reasoning could be that the financial crisis is recorded only at the date when it 
happened, however, graphical analysis shows that this year still associates with solid 
budget surpluses, while the deterioration usually happens only afterwards. Thus, a 
conclusion can be made that financial distress affects primary balance of the CEE 
countries in a much slower way than it influences developed countries and some other 
emerging economies. 
As regards other explanatory variables, higher interest payments seem to impact 
primary balance in a positive way during the pre-crisis period. In line with the 
“squeezing feeling” hypothesis of Debrun and Kinda (2013) our results show that fiscal 
authorities try to balance public expenditures and interest payments in order to sustain 
current debt burden. However, the relation between the interest payments and the 
primary balance is negative for the crisis period sample model meaning that CEE 
countries turn to ignore increasing interest payments. Together with the insignificant 
coefficient of interest payments in the full period sample model these results provide 
evidence that the “squeezing feeling” of the interest burden in CEE countries got 
distorted with the beginning of the Greate Recession. 
The old age dependency ratio affects the primary balance in a significantly positive way 
during the pre-crisis period showing that countries with a higher proportion of the older 
population account for that when conducting fiscal policy by having a larger surplus. 
However, the coefficient becomes insignificant when estimating the model on the full 
period sample. Moreover, it changes its sign to negative in the crisis period sample 
model meaning that implicit budget liabilities related to the ageing population lose their 
priority in the crisis or post-crisis conditions. 
The fiscal rule index has a significant positive effect on primary surplus in the pre-crisis 
and full period sample models. It’s expected that better regulation of the fiscal policy 
would force authorities to tighten the budget in order to control debt levels. Again, the 
effect loses its significance and even turns to be negative if we estimate the model on 
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the crisis period sample only. The turn of the business cycle seems to distort the positive 
influence of the fiscal regulations on the fiscal policy. It can be reasoned that the tighter 
are the fiscal rules in a country the less flexible the decision-making process gets. That’s 
why in the recessionnary conditions, when the authorities should react as soon as 
possible in a countercyclical manner, and eventually strict fiscal rules have to be 
ignored, the effect on the primary balance gets more severe in countries with less 
flexibility. 
An interesting discussion could be held concerning the effect of the unconventional 
monetary policy measure. The shadow policy rate has no significant influence on the 
primary balance if we consider the full period sample, but it does seem to have a 
significant positive effect after the beginning of the crisis. It means that if the authorities 
use the quantitative easing reflected in decreasing shadow policy rate the primary 
balance goes down as well. It could be explained by a common view that the use of the 
unconventional monetary policies weakens fiscal discipline stimulating economic 
growth in a superficial way rather than implementing structural reforms.  
Finally, the election variable remains negative but statistically insignificant through all 
the model specifications. It means that the primary deficit increases on the average 
during election year but the variability of this effect is too high to claim that it is strictly 
negative for the whole country sample. Consequently, the fiscal policy in CEE countries 
remains relatively free from the influence of politics. 
Comparing our main results with the available results for developed countries one can 
notice that the primary balance persistence in our baseline model is lower than in those, 
0.36 compared to around 0.5-0.7. The coefficient of the lagged debt in the pre-crisis 
period model is considerably higher than the one for the developed countries, 0.06 as 
opposed to around 0.02-0.03, and similar to the one for the developing countries, 
between 0.04 and 0.08, estimated in the literature. However, the one estimated in the 
crisis period model is around twice as large as those (0.17). Thus, the investigated 
sample of countries is more sensitive to the debt accumulation than the developed 
economies. As was noted before, there is some evidence on the ‘fiscal fatigue’ in the 
recent time meaning that CEE countries are starting to have fiscal behavior similar to 
the developed countries’ one. The negative sign of the coefficients of the current 
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account and the positive one of the financial crisis variables strictly differentiate CEE 
sample from the developed countries showing the irrelevance of the twin deficit 
hypothesis and slow response of the fiscal policy to the financial distress. 
We end the section by performing several robustness checks of the estimations. First, 
we’ve already dealt with period effect estimating the model over three sub-samples 
based on the stage of the business cycle, these are the pre-crises period, crisis period and 
full sample. Most of the coefficients stay consistent through the time frames and model 
specifications. Although some of the estimates shift dramatically, it was shown that 
there is a reasonable economic intuition behind these changes.  
Table 3. Robustness checks with alternative estimators: FE, FE-IV and GMM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The FE model is the baseline model (Model 1 in Table 2) that uses fixed effects and GLS cross-
section weights. FE-IV additionally uses instrumental variables and 2SLS. GMM is estimated based on 
differenced variables making use of instrumental variables and robust standard errors. Sargan test is based 
on the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Standard errors of the coefficients are given in 
parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation. 
Next, we estimate the baseline models using alternative methods, FE-IV and GMM. The 
results are shown in the Table 3. The variables of the HICP and financial crisis variables 
become insignificant in the FE-IV model, while the coefficients for the lagged primary 
balance, lagged debt, lagged debt squared and GDP gap are almost identical to the 
baseline ones. In the GMM specification the coefficient of the lagged debt variable gets 
Dependent variable :   
  
    
 FE FE IV GMM 
        
0.363*** 
(0.0716) 
0.3874*** 
(0.0665)  
0.2993** 
(0.0794) 
       
0.0926*** 
(0.035) 
0.08078*** 
(0.0374)    
0.2564*** 
(0.0697)    
        
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
      
0.2233*** 
(0.0411) 
0.222*** 
(0.044) 
0.128*** 
(0.0532) 
       
-0.0217*** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0104 
(0.0101) 
-0.0241** 
(0.0115) 
     
-0.0081 
(0.0284) 
-0.016 
(0.0385) 
-0.1458*** 
(0.0522) 
      
2.629** 
(1.0577) 
1.8054 
(1.1675) 
2.2511** 
(1.0344) 
Const 
-1.8301** 
(0.8039) 
-2.3935** 
(1.087) 
 
No. of observations   166 160 150 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8463   
Sargan test   0.129 
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much higher than in the baseline in line with our expectations discussed in the 
methodology section. On the other hand, the effects of lagged primary balance and GDP 
gap become considerably smaller while retaining their significance and the CA variable 
gains stronger negative effect and becomes highly significant making up for the sharp 
increase in the lagged debt coefficient. The effects of the HICP and financial crisis 
variables are close to the ones in the baseline. Thus, the size and significance of the 
main coefficients are consistent with the one in the baseline proving the stability of the 
baseline estimations. 
The last type of robustness check is implemented across the country dimension. In this 
respect, we examine the issue of panel heterogeneity by running the benchmark 
specification dropping one country at a time. A single FPRF estimated over a panel of 
countries and a shorter time frame presupposes country-invariant fiscal behavior. We 
want to capture how the results would differ depending on the inclusion/exclusion of 
individual countries. Debt coefficients with their standard errors and significance levels 
from this procedure are summarized in Table 4. The exclusion of countries does not 
seem to alter the results significantly. Excluding highly indebted  members seems to 
decrease the reaction coefficient of primary balance to debt only marginally.  
Table 4. Fiscal reaction coefficient excluding individual countries 
Country  -coef Standart Error 
Bulgaria 0.0665**  0.0276 
Czech Republic 0.0966** 0.0408 
Estonia 0.0929** 0.0366 
Latvia 0.1052** 0.0418 
Lithuania 0.0893*** 0.0319 
Hungary 0.1444*** 0.0357 
Poland 0.0934*** 0.0335 
Romania 0.0546* 0.0285 
Slovenia 0.0954*** 0.0341 
Slovakia 0.0895*** 0.0310 
 
Note: The table shows the coefficient of the lagged debt and its standard error for the baseline 
specification of the model (model 1 in Table 2) with one country excluded at a time. P-value: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own 
calculation. 
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Hungary and Romania are outliers in the sense that the coefficients without Hungary are 
in most cases systematically larger and without Romania systematically smaller than in 
the baseline reflecting the fact that the debt ratio in both countries differs substantially 
from the average debt ratio in the CEE sample. Nonetheless, when we excluded both 
Hungary and Romania at the same time, the resulting coefficients still lay within the 
95% confidence interval around the CEE estimates. For this reason, we believe that the 
investigated specification of the primary balance model is appropriate. Overall, the 
statistical significance and sign of the estimated coefficients remains unaffected by 
country exclusions. 
6. Conclusions 
This study makes use of the panel time series analysis and fiscal policy reaction 
function to assess sustainability of the fiscal policy in Central and Eastern European 
countries. So far, CEE have performed well in comparison to the developed European 
economies which was reflected in lower public debt-to-GDP ratios and economic 
growth exceeding the interest rate on public debt. Therefore, CEE governments were 
able to fulfil intertemporal budgetary constraint and to keep their fiscal policy out of the 
solvency risks. However, the increasing rate of public debt in the aftermath of the global 
financial and the sovereign debt crises poses a serious threat to fiscal sustainability.  
First of all, let us turn to the stationarity testing, which is not the core part of the 
sustainability assessment, but a necessary step to characterize the responsiveness of 
fiscal policy to debt dynamics. At the national level, the hypothesis of sustainability of 
fiscal policy cannot be accepted for all countries. The break point unit root test indicates 
that fiscal authorities in CEE countries have maintained sustainable fiscal policies. 
These results were also further confirmed by panel estimation of the fiscal reaction 
function.  
Moving further on to the question in the paper’s title, we arrive at the following 
conclusions. Considering the time frame of 1995-2015 we come to conclusions that the 
primary balance in the CEE countries is less persistent compared to the one in 
developed countries and appears to be extra responsive to increasing public debt (in a 
corrective manner) and to business cycle fluctuations (in a countercyclical manner) in 
 37 
line with the recent literature. Compared to elsewhere in the literature, our model 
suggests stronger estimates of the fiscal policy response to both lagged government debt 
and output gap, i.e. that any increase (decrease) of debt or output gap will increase 
(decrease) primary balance in the course of the adjustment process. Further, we allow 
for non-linear relationship between primary balance and lagged debt.  
Although the validity of the results of the model estimated on the crisis sub-sample of 
2007-2015 might be questioned, they still bring some important evidence. First, the 
response to the lagged debt gets twice as high as in the baseline model, while the 
quadratic debt term becomes significant meaning the presence of the ‘fiscal fatigue’ in 
the crisis period. Next, the response to the business cycle becomes acyclical, while 
reaction to variables of interest payments, old age dependency ratio and fiscal rule index 
change their signs, which says that with the beginning of the crisis the fiscal authorities 
suddenly change their behavior and ignore usual priorities. Finally, the primary balance 
surplus seems to deteriorate as a response to decreasing shadow policy rate, which 
could be considered as the evidence of a harmless effect of the unconventional 
monetary policy on the fiscal discipline. 
One way to improve the research would be to use the so-called real time data estimating 
the fiscal policy reaction function. It was pointed out in the literature that reaction 
functions estimated based on ex post data can’t accurately describe policymakers 
intentions, since this data doesn’t correspond to the one available at that particular time. 
There is a possibility that even though policymakers seek to run countercyclical 
discretionary policy, they find it hard to do so in reality because of data limitations. In 
this case, fiscal policymakers are not malintentioned, but simply misinformed. Thus, the 
estimation of behavioral rules based on ex post data might mislead the researcher 
pointing to the wrong conclusions. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the text, developing economies are often vulnerable to the 
issue of the asymmetry in the response of fiscal policy to the different phases of the 
business cycle. Our results show that there is a change in the fiscal behavior of the 
countries after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. That’s why another extension 
to the model could be the incorporation of this asymmetry. It would help to investigate 
in more detail the shift in fiscal policy reaction. 
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We conclude our research with a discussion of the question about the sustainability of 
the CEE countries. Even though there is enough evidence to say that their fiscal policy 
is sustainable, we can’t say that they are forever immune to the sustainability issues. 
Being solvent in the good times is not enough to assure a country from sudden structural 
changes leading to sustainability deterioration. The careful analysis of fiscal deficits and 
debt accumulation dynamics in the CEE countries shows that the fiscal tightening is 
indispensable. An increase in individual, production and property taxes and social 
contributions together with a rise in unproductive expenditures would have an adverse 
effect on economic growth. Hence, policy makers should focus on reforms that lower 
overall expenditures (preferably unproductive ones) rather than increasing taxes.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Theoretical Background 
The requirement that the ratio of debt to GDP converges back towards its initial level is one 
of the first definitions of sustainable fiscal policy (Buiter, 1985; Blanchard, 1990). 
However, government debt may remain very high for decades and still experience large 
fluctuations over time. The former criticism was resolved by defining the sustainability in a 
more general way. The IMF defines a country’s debt sustainable if it is able to continue 
servicing its debt without an unrealistically large future corrections to the balance of income 
and expenditures (IMF, 2007). Unsustainable position entails the need for a “drastic” policy 
changes such as a sudden fiscal tightening which might cause a recession, or even the 
inability to service the debt, default (Collignon and Mundschenk, 1999). In our paper, we 
will refer to fiscal sustainability as government capacity, under the current policy mix, to 
achieve a declared debt ratio while remaining solvent9. 
The starting point of “unpleasant debt arithmetic” is the government budget constraint. The 
one-period budget constraint is given by: 
                      (1) 
where    is the government expenditures, excluding interest payments;    is the 
government tax revenues;    is the real market value of government debt;    is the real 
interest rate;        is interest payments on the level of debt accumulated in the end of the 
previous period. Alternatively, we can rewrite equation (1) as: 
               (2) 
where    is primary budget balance or deficit, the difference between revenues and real 
expenditures. However, sometimes it may be reasonable to accumulate debt during the bad 
times and to pay it back during the subsequent boom. Intertemporal budget constraint 
accounts for short term variations over time. 
To derive the lifetime budget constraint first we need to rewrite the flow of budget 
constraint. Assuming that the government is subject to the same restriction, equation (1) 
should hold for any value of   in the interval      . After several rounds of iterations we 
would obtain: 
    ∑
         
∏         
 
   
      ∏
    
        
 
   
 
      (3) 
 Applying a simple arithmetical transformation we obtain: 
     ∑
 
        
                 
    
        
 
      (4) 
Equation (4) provides a link between the amount of debt the government has at two dates: t-
1 and t + s. In particular, the amount of debt the government has on date t + s is a function 
of the debt it initially holds at date t, as well as the primary surpluses it ran, and seigniorage 
it raised between these dates. 
                                                             
9 For more detailes refer to Afonso (2005), Arestis, et al. (2002) and Arghyrou and Luintel, (2007). 
 47 
Intuitively, the lifetime budget constraint states that in the case of sustainable fiscal policy 
present value of existing stock of debt must be equal to the present value of future primary 
surpluses. This is possible only when the last term in the equation (4), approaches zero: 
     
    
        
  . This equality is frequently referred to as no-Ponzi or transversality 
condition. 
No-Ponzi game condition is a constraint that prevents overaccumulation of debt, i.e. 
requiring the present value of wealth to be always positive. If the government would allow 
the debt level to be forever increasing, it would be running a Ponzi-scheme which might 
ultimately oblige it to repudiate its debt. McCallum (1984) has shown that under certain 
assumptions a deficit can be maintained permanently without inflation if it is financed by 
bonds. However, given that a government’s taxing capacities are limited, default incentives 
would grow infinitely. 
No-Ponzi scheme condition imposes testable restrictions on the time series of public debt 
and budget deficit: 
i) The value of current public debt must be equal to the sum of future primary 
surpluses: 
     ∑
 
        
           
 
      (5) 
ii) The present value of public debt must approach zero in infinity: 
     
    
        
       (6) 
As was mentioned earlier, fiscal sustainability requires the government to be solvent, which 
means that it is able to hold stable debt/GDP ratio in the long run (weak solvency). Hence, 
the next step would be to derive government budget constraint in terms of GDP-ratios. For 
that we simply divide equation (1)  by real GDP: 
  
  
 
          
          
 
  
  
 
  
  
  (7) 
Defining the lower-case letters as ratios of the corresponding upper-case variables to 
nominal GDP, we simplify the equation (7) to:  
     ∑ (
   
   
)
   
[         ]           (
   
   
)
   
 
     (8) 
This condition constrains the debt stock to grow faster than the real interest rate (r > y), 
given that          (
   
   
)
   
  , unless the primary budget yields a sufficient surplus. 
To illustrate this, suppose that interest rates on government bonds were smaller than the rate 
of economic growth. Prolonged periods of deficits do not indicate an unsustainable fiscal 
position. In such economy the budget constraint  is in fact irrelevant as debt can be rolled 
over indefinitely. However, if the interest rate were to surpass the GDP growth rate with 
some positive probability, even zero primary surpluses would become unsustainable 
(Claeys, 2007). 
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Appendix 2. Literatute reiew 
Table 2.1. Empirical evidence regarding fiscal sustainability 
Study Period 
Country 
study 
Methodology Model specification 
Is the fiscal policy 
sustainable? 
Bohn 
(1998) 
1916-1995, 
annual 
frequency 
USA 
OLS with NeweyWest S.E., GVAR and YVAR fiscal variables, 
extensions: fiscal fatigue (second and third polynomial terms, 
break at 34%); subsamples, 
Primary surpluses 
and public debt 
The primary surplus has historically 
responded positively to increases in debt. 
Galí and 
Perotti 
(2003) 
1980–2002, 
annual 
frequency 
EU-
11+OECD-5 
FE and IV FE estimator with country fixed effects, extensions: 
debt as a fraction of potential GDP, expected output gap, pre- 
vs. post-Maastricht period; monetary policy rule; government 
investment, spending, and revenues to potential output; 
CAPB and general 
government primary 
deficit divided by 
potential output 
The bihaviour of discretionary fiscal policy 
during recessions turned from being somewhat 
pro-cyclical to becoming counter-cyclical. 
Abiad and 
Ostry 
(2005) 
1990–2002, 
annual 
frequency 
31 EM's 
FGLS estimator, debt spline at 50%; extensions: alternative 
fiscal institution measures; 
Debt ratio 
Primary surpluses respond positively to 
increases in debt at low and moderate levels of 
debt but it gets only marginally responsive at 
high levels; The primary balance behaves in a 
procyclical manne 
Golinelli 
and 
Momigliano 
(2006) 
1988–2006, 
annual 
frequency 
19 OECD 
and EU-11 
Real-time data, various estimators (OLS, FE, GMM), country 
and fixed effects; extensions: dummy variables for stages of 
European monetary integration, phases of RBC and election 
cycle, a Maastricht variable (number of years for elimination of 
the excessive deficit and expected interest payments); testing 
symmetry of fiscal responses; 
Change of CAPB, 
lagged PB included 
Fiscal policies react in a stabilizing manner to 
the initial state of public finances; 
There is countercyclical reaction of fiscal 
policy to economic conditions. 
Debrun et 
al. 
(2008) 
1990–2005, 
annual 
frequency 
EU-25 
OLS, LSDVC, FE and FE IV estimator with country fixed 
effects; extensions: subgroups estimations, focus on fiscal rules; 
General government 
and cyclically 
adjusted balance  
Balanced budget and debt rules have a 
stronger and significant effect in determining 
higher cyclcically adjusted primary balances 
Mendoza 
and Ostry 
(2008) 
1980/1990–
2005, annual 
frequency 
22 DM's and 
34 EM's 
FE estimator with country-fixed effects, robust S.E. with 
country AR(1) coefficients; extensions: subsamples (high/low 
debt countries); spline regression (threshold at 48%); shorter 
periods for most emerging countries; YVAR and GVAR 
government expenditure variables; 
Lagged debt, output 
gap 
The primary balance responds in corrective 
manner to increases in debt; The primary 
balance behaves in a countercyclical manner; 
Afonso and 
Jalles (2011) 
1970–2010, 
annual 
frequency 
18 OECD 
Pooled OLS and FE IV estimators, system GMM estimator, 
narrow specification (debt and/or output gap only) extensions: 
panel time series estimation (MG, AMG, CCEMG) and 
Driscoll-Kraay estimator. 
First-differenced 
level of government 
debt/GDP 
The primary balance responds in a corrective 
manner to an increasing public debt; The 
primary balance responds in a countercyclical 
manner to business cycle fluctuations. 
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Appendix 2. Literatute reiew 
Table 2.1. Empirical evidence regarding fiscal sustainability (continued) 
Study Period 
Country 
study 
Methodology Model specification 
Is the fiscal policy 
sustainable? 
Eller and 
Urvová 
(2012) 
1995–2011, 
annual 
frequency 
8 new EU 
member 
states 
Pooled OLS, FE, system GMM estimators with fixed and time 
effects; extensions: debt spline (at 40%), output gap analysis, 
various election variables and price indices, fiscal institutions 
(FRI, WB governance). 
Lagged PB, lagged 
debt ratio, CPI, Crisis 
dummy, output gap 
The primary balance responds in a 
corrective manner to an increasing public 
debt; The primary balance responds in a 
countercyclical manner to business cycle 
fluctuations. 
Ghosh et al. 
(2013) 
1970/1985–
2007, annual 
frequency 
23 DE’s 
FE estimator with robust S.E. and with AR(1) error term 
process; extensions: fiscal fatigue explored (coefficients of the 
second and third polynomial), government expenditure gap; 
Lagged debt, output 
gap, government 
expenditure debt 
The marginal response of primary balance 
to lagged debt is nonlinear, remaining 
positive at moderate debt levels but 
starting to decline when debt reaches 
around 90-100 percent of GDP. 
Debrun and 
Kinda (2013) 
1980–2010, 
annual 
frequency 
28 DM's and 
26 EM's 
FE and LSDVC estimator; extensions: interest payments, and 
interest payments thresholds (linear); 
Lagged PB, lagged 
debt, output gap, crisis 
dummy 
The primary balance responds in 
corrective manner to increases in debt; 
The primary balance behaves in a 
countercyclical manner; 
Debrun and 
Kinda (2014) 
1990–2011, 
annual 
frequency 
28 DM's and 
26 EM's 
LSDVC estimator; extensions: exploring fiscal 
rules and fiscal councils; 
Lagged PB, lagged 
debt, lagged output 
gap, fiscal rule index, 
time dummies 
The primary balance responds in 
corrective manner to increases in debt; 
The primary balance behaves in a 
countercyclical manner; 
D’Erasmo, 
Mendoza, 
Zhang (2015) 
1951–2013, 
annual 
frequency 
25 DM's and 
33 EM's 
FE with White cross-section corrected S.E. with 
output gap and government expenditures; 
extensions: government expenditure or 
consumption gap (HP filter), country AR(1) 
error. 
Lagged debt, gdp gap 
There is positive, conditional response of 
the primary balance to debt and to gdp gap 
meaning countercyclical behaviour. 
 
Baldi and 
Staehr 
(2016) 
2001Q1–
2008Q2; 
2009Q1–
2014Q1  
EU-27 
2SLS estimation with robust S.E., country fixed effects and 
quarterly dummies with GDP growth only; variables are not 
seasonally adjusted. 
Extensions: various subgroups of countries (EA12, CEE10, 
old and new EU countries grouped by “seriousness” of their 
fiscal problems); 
Lagged PB, lagged 
debt, output gap 
Little feedback from the debt stock to the 
primary balance in the pre-crisis period; 
Much more feedback in the crisis period; 
The primary balance behaves in a 
persistent and countercyclical manner. 
Source: Afonso (2004) and Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek (2017) and a survey from the authors. 
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Appendix 3. Data sources 
Table 3.1. Variables description and sources 
Fiscal policy reaction function main variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Debt ratio 
(   ) 
General government consolidated gross debt, Excessive 
deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) and former 
definition (linked series) (% of GDP at market prices) 
AMECO(UDGG) 
Primary balance 
(    ) 
General government primary balance (ESA 1995, EDP) 
(% of GDP at market prices) 
AMECO(UBLGI) 
Current account 
(    ) 
Current account, Balance of payments statistics (% of 
GDP at market prices) 
AMECO (UBCABOP) 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
(   
  
) 
Dummy equal to one for country-year observations in 
which there is a banking, currency and/or sovereign debt 
crisis, and zero otherwise.  
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
Price index 
(      ) 
Harmonised consumer price index: all items (HICP) AMECO (PVGD, ZCPIH) 
Output gap 
(     ) 
Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product 
at 2010 reference levels (% of GDP at market prices) 
AMECO (AVGDGP) 
Shadow rate 
(   ) 
The policy rate as it would be if it could be negative, based 
on asset purchases and other unconventional tools. 
Wu and Xia (2017,2014) 
Election dummy 
(   
     ) 
Dummy that is 1 when an election (legislative or 
presidential) was held in a certain year, 0 otherwise; 
Internet sources 
Old-age dependency 
ratio 
(     ) 
The ratio between the number of persons aged 65 and over 
(age when they are generally economically inactive) and 
the number of persons aged between 15 and 64.  
Eurostat 
Fiscal rules index 
(     ) 
Fiscal rules index; Sum of fiscal rule strength indices in 
force in the respective Member State weighted by the 
coverage of general government finances of the respective 
rule (i.e. public expenditure of the government sub 
sector(s) concerned by the rule over total general 
government expenditure). 
EC database 
Interest payments 
(     ) 
The absolute volume of payments (ESA 1995); (as % of 
GDP, lagged debt or total revenues) 
AMECO (UYIG) 
Instrumental variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP at market prices) IMF WEO 
US GDP growth Growth rate of GDP at market prices OECD 
Russia GDP growth Growth rate of GDP at market prices OECD 
Oil prices growth 
Growth rate of the oil price: Crude Oil (petroleum), Price 
index, 2005 = 100, simple average of three spot prices; 
Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai 
Fateh 
IMF WEO 
Non-fuel commodity 
price 
Non-Fuel Price Index, 2005 = 100, includes Food and 
Beverages and Industrial Inputs Price Indices 
IMF WEO 
US short-term 
interest rate 
Short-term interest rate in the USA OECD 
Potential GDP Potential GDP at 2010 reference levels AMECO 
Unemployment rate 
Unemployed % of active population (EUROSTAT 
definition) 
AMECO 
 
Note: * series from the European Commission AMECO database (updated on 13/02/2017). 
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Appendix 4. Evolution of main fiscal series in CEE countries  
Fig. 4.1. Fiscal series: government debt and primary balance, 1995-2016 
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Source: Authors, using data from European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data).  
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics of main FPRF variables 
 
Country 
Government debt   Primary balance 
Mean Max Min 
Jarque-
Bera test 
  Mean Max Min 
Jarque-
Bera test 
Bulgaria 37.3483 97.2611 13.031 2.9855 
 
2.0604 9.2162 -4.5864 0.0613 
Czech Republic 28.3115 44.9086 11.5915 1.3534 
 
-2.5153 1.1969 -11.4284 21.8426*** 
Estonia 6.7532 10.671 3.6636 1.95 
 
0.5742 3.0728 -2.943 0.8665 
Latvia 22.6624 47.4331 8.4301 3.2206 
 
-1.035 2.2845 -7.5352 10.4699*** 
Lithuania 25.3568 42.6983 11.5203 2.5109 
 
-1.9527 1.3213 -11.0213 11.4082*** 
Hungary 67.9695 84.2932 51.7037 1.7263 
 
-0.0139 4.6875 -5.455 1.0905 
Poland 46.4618 55.682 36.4532 1.0566 
 
-1.2945 1.4375 -4.8527 1.9535 
Romania 23.445 39.3858 6.5694 1.5666 
 
-1.236 0.8764 -7.9593 9.8505*** 
Slovenia 37.6192 83.149 18.3089 5.6169* 
 
-1.7083 1.1551 -12.4624 34.3708*** 
Slovakia 40.7484 54.7392 21.672 1.2437 
 
-2.7486 -0.1751 -8.0243 3.0944 
Country 
Current Account 
 
Output gap 
Mean Max Min 
Jarque-
Bera test  
Mean Max Min 
Jarque-
Bera test 
Bulgaria -5.7474 4.2 -23.9 4.3337 
 
0.2927 5.2039 -4.3767 0.579 
Czech Republic -2.8182 1.1 -6.2 0.6866 
 
0.0934 5.8003 -3.0887 3.1431 
Estonia -5.5954 2.7 -15.0 1.6374 
 
0.8313 14.3678 -9.0085 0.4706 
Latvia -5.8941 7.8 -20.7 0.7189 
 
0.0086 10.5865 -12.1649 1.7439 
Lithuania -4.2615 3.6 -15.1 1.0783 
 
-0.1732 8.8653 -10.4815 0.4082 
Hungary -3.4136 4.8 -8.5 2.4218 
 
-0.2821 4.4199 -4.4428 0.4668 
Poland -3.6692 -0.3 -6.7 0.907 
 
-0.0438 2.8163 -4.3161 1.5758 
Romania -5.5889 -0.7 -13.8 1.6114 
 
-0.1871 7.4818 -5.3262 1.9792 
Slovenia 0.1091 6.8 -5.3 1.5264 
 
-0.2462 6.826 -5.6682 1.2671 
Slovakia -4.0231 1.9 -10.6 0.9993 
 
-0.1041 7.1957 -3.5866 4.9755* 
 
 Source: Data obtained from European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data).    
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Appendix 5. Stylized facts on public finance in CEE countries 
 
Policy-makers in most EU countries faced substantial problems of keeping fiscal discipline and 
balanced budgets. In many member states gross national debt levels reached 100% of GDP by 2016 
and in some cases have even exceeded this limit. As can be seen from figure 2 government debt during 
the last two decades have increased substantially from 70.8% of GDP in 1995 to 91.5% of GDP in 
2016, raising serious concerns regarding the sustainability of monetary union (Fig.1.). 
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Figure 1: Public Debt of Euro area and CEE countries, in percent of GDP  
Source: Authors, using data from European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data). 
Comparing with advanced European economies the average public debt-to-GDP ratio for CEE 
countries has been safely below 60% of GDP, with the highest ratio recorded in Slovenia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. Most of the CEE countries entered the EU with small explicit liabilities (Fig.2.). 
For instance, Romania repaid all the external debt in 1989, Poland made special arrangements with 
their creditors. Hence, they did not have time for debt accumulation. Overall, low values of public debt 
suggest "good" and sustainable fiscal policy, but a deeper investigation of public finances highlights 
some issues that might make fiscal policy vulnerable from the perspective of the IBC.  
In addition, CEE countries faced many challenges connected to their young market economy status. 
First of all, CEE countries have not enjoyed the benefits of prolonged economic growth compared to 
other advanced economies. This fact has prevented the governments from raising sufficient buffer 
funds to sustain the economy over the cyclical downturns (with exception of Estonia). 
Growing needs in capital investments during transition period made CEE-10 governments compete in 
the “great fiscal loosening race”, in order to stimulate investments and economic growth. In Czech 
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Republic, Hungary and Poland, the loosening took place from 1999 to 2003, and represented a fiscal 
relaxation of 0.75% of GDP per year. In the other CEE countries, it was lasting for seven years, but 
had a smaller annual relaxation of around 0.38%.  
 
Figure 2. Government Debt-GDP Ratio in the 28 EU (2016) 
Source: Authors, using data from European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data). 
For many Central and Eastern European economies, the membership in monetary union opened access 
to cheap borrowing to finance current deficits. The real implicit interest rate on public debt was much 
lower in CEE countries than in EU-15 countries. This led to increased public debt accumulation and 
consumption spending. Strong reliance on foreign capital together with expansionary spending policies 
during 2000-2007 made public finances vulnerable to the economic downturn. As was argued by 
Calvo et al. (2003) sudden stop in capital flows can force abrupt adjustments in current account 
deficits that in turn may compromise the ability to service public debt in the future. As a result, almost 
all CEE countries entered the crisis with weak budgetary positions. The average fiscal deficit rose 
substantially to 6% of GDP in 2009, up from a pre-crisis level of around 2%. The increase in the 
deficit was accompanied by high budget debt and resulted notably in the pushing up of interest 
payments during the recession (Zaidi and Rejniak’s, 2010).  
As the euro area sovereign debt crisis escalated, the government implemented various st imulus 
packages. For instance, Poland fuelled about €20.6 billion into the economy during 2008. It enacted a 
discretionary fiscal relaxation of 4.5% of GDP and allowed the automatic stabilisers to work. As a 
result, the fiscal balance, after having significantly improved during 2006 and 2007, went up from less 
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than 2% of GDP in 2007 to above 7% of GDP in 2009, becoming is one of the highest rates among 
CEE countries (Zaidi and Rejniak’s, 2010).  
While other states did their best to boost economic growth by fueling their economy out of recession, 
Baltic countries had already experienced serious expenditures cuts in the previous years of the 2008 
recession, thus efficiently reducing the impact of the crisis. Of all CEE states, Estonia has been doing 
the best in terms of holding sustainable deficit and debt levels. It was enjoying a substantial 
government surplus of 2.5% of GDP in 2006 and in 2009 had a small deficit of only 1.7% of GDP. 
After the aggressive phase of the recession ended governments enacted various consolidation plans, 
cutting back on spending through 2011. On the revenue side, countries managed to shift the tax burden 
to more neutral forms of taxation—such as the Value-Added Tax. On the spending side, countries 
implemented large cuts in public investment. However, Lithuania and Slovenia managed even to 
increase capital spending, despite fiscal consolidation. The effect of these policy measures was a rapid 
deficit reduction, which in turn suppressed revenue streams and keeps them trapped below pre-crisis 
levels. 
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Appendix 6. Individual unit root test results 
Table 6.1. Unit root tests for the government debt to GDP, (1995–2015) 
Country Assumption 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test
a)
 
Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) test
b) 
Ng-Perron (NP) test
c) 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
t-stat LM-stat NP-stat NP-stat NP-stat NP-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bulgaria 
Intercept -3.1125* 0.4821** -0.2241 0.23 1.0262 55.1086 
Trend and Intercept -3.0322 0.1678** -0.0178 -0.0099 0.5568 70.1365 
Czech Republic 
Intercept -2.0546 0.6061** -0.2052 -0.1616 0.7877 35.3839 
Trend and Intercept 1.0447 0.0682 -8.5419 -1.8235 0.2135 11.3705 
Estonia 
Intercept -0.9302 0.2882 -2.2812 -0.9308 0.408 9.7646 
Trend and Intercept -1.8236 0.1678** -1.6435 -0.8262 0.5027 48.4047 
Hungary 
Intercept -2.2487 0.3069 -3.3467 -1.2914 0.3859 7.3185 
Trend and Intercept -1.2031 0.1267* -1.9681 -0.9916 0.5038 46.2736 
Latvia 
Intercept -1.2707 0.504** -1.5525 -0.7112 0.4581 12.612 
Trend and Intercept 1.3856 0.1175 -5.5599 -1.6663 0.2997 16.3868 
Lithuania 
Intercept -0.6929 0.5196** -0.3498 -0.1823 0.5211 18.7191 
Trend and Intercept -3.6408* 0.1134 -5.2746 -1.6216 0.3074 17.2658 
Poland 
Intercept -0.2431 0.5052** 2.2288 -0.9328 0.4185 10.048 
Trend and Intercept 0.0431 0.0985 -3.9672 -1.408 0.3549 22.964 
Romania 
Intercept 0.5527 0.4623* -0.9999 -0.433 0.433 13.3633 
Trend and Intercept -0.6798 0.0997 -6.1556 -1.7483 0.284 14.7968 
Slovakia 
Intercept -3.4547*** 0.2793 -2.4499 -0.9141 0.3731 8.9458 
Trend and Intercept -3.4544* 0.0909 -5.2899 -1.6235 0.3069 17.2143 
Slovenia 
Intercept 0.7697 0.5143** 1.5856 1.1082 0.6989 40.9678 
Trend and Intercept -1.6764 0.1563** -1.5212 -0.7305 0.4802 46.1569 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Eviews 8. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 
10 per cent level of significance. 
a) For ADF test automatic lag length selection based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8. The maximum lag length is calculated by Schwert (1989) rule of thumb:      [   (
 
   
)
   
]. 
b) The KPSS test based on Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel. Asymptotic critical values reported by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are 0.739, 0.463  and 0.347 for 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively , for the model with intercept, in case of model with a trend and intercept critical values are 0.216, 0.146 and 0.119. 
c)  The NP test based on Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel Test critical values reported by Ng and Perron (Table 1, 2001) for the level stationarity are given: 
    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
1% -13.8000 -2.58000 0.17400 1.78000 
5% -8.10000 -1.98000 0.23300 3.17000 
10% -5.70000 -1.62000 0.27500 4.45000 
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Table 6.2. Unt root tests for the primary balance to GDP, (1995–2015) 
Country Assumption 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test
a)
 
Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) test
b) 
Ng-Perron (NP) test
c) 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
t-stat LM-stat NP-stat NP-stat NP-stat NP-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bulgaria 
Intercept -1.8982 0.5867** -3.0579 -1.1978 0.3917 7.93 
Trend and Intercept -1.7909 0.108 -6.7418 -1.71 0.2536 13.5594 
Czech Republic 
Intercept -4.9418*** 0.5978** -3.2616 -1.0389 0.3185 7.2311 
Trend and Intercept -3.5564* 0.0595 -6.5584 -1.8077 0.2756 3.8941 
Estonia 
Intercept 2.307 0.0849 -6.2682* -1.7622* 0.2811* 3.9339* 
Trend and Intercept 1.4147 0.0665 -6.3967 -1.7884 0.2796 14.2456 
Hungary 
Intercept -2.219 0.1776 -7.332* -1.8991* 0.259* 3.3958* 
Trend and Intercept -2.4495 0.1772** -7.0541 -1.8632 0.2641 12.9325 
Latvia 
Intercept -1.0417 0.1155 -8.5084** -2.0213** 0.2376** 3.0299** 
Trend and Intercept -2.7783 0.0949 8.6271 -2.0164 0.2337 10.751 
Lithuania 
Intercept -2.9345** 0.1142 -8.7017** -2.0442** 0.2349** 2.9684** 
Trend and Intercept -1.7306 0.0798 -9.8254 -2.1963 0.2235 9.3573 
Poland 
Intercept -6.5406*** 0.3141 -5.254 -1.6207 0.3085 4.6634 
Trend and Intercept -7.0579*** 0.1319* -7.2614 -1.8116 0.2495 12.6733 
Romania 
Intercept -2.2476 0.1697 -5.414 -1.6449 0.3038 4.5263 
Trend and Intercept -1.8 0.0896 -5.8725 -1.7006 0.2896 15.4919 
Slovakia 
Intercept -1.257 0.2554 -9.7946** -2.1918** 0.2238** 2.581** 
Trend and Intercept -4.2047** 0.0672 -9.0554 -2.1202 0.2341 10.0901 
Slovenia 
Intercept -2.0934 0.1909 -10.0861** -2.187** 0.2168** 2.6485** 
Trend and Intercept -2.1929 0.092 -8.0896 -1.9581 0.242 11.3986 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Eviews 8. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 
10 per cent level of significance. 
a) For ADF test automatic lag length selection based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8. The maximum lag length is calculated by Schwert (1989) rule of thumb:      [   (
 
   
)
   
]. 
b) The KPSS test based on Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel. Asymptotic critical values reported by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are 0.739, 0.463  and 0.347 for 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively , for the model with intercept, in case of model with a trend and intercept critical values are 0.216, 0.146 and 0.119. 
c)  The NP test based on Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel Test critical values reported by Ng and Perron (Table 1, 2001) for the level stationarity are given: 
    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
1% -13.8000 -2.58000 0.17400 1.78000 
5% -8.10000 -1.98000 0.23300 3.17000 
10% -5.70000 -1.62000 0.27500 4.45000 
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Table 6.3. Tests for Structural Change in the Public Debt series, (1995–2015) 
 
Country Assumption 
Zivot and Andrews (1992)
a)
 Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
b)
 
t-stat   ̂  t-stat   ̂    ̂  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bulgaria 
Intercept Na Na -7.8055*** 2005 2013 
Trend and Intercept Na Na -5.8986 2007 2010 
Czech Republic 
Intercept -0.2576* 2007 -1.9045 2006 2010 
Trend and Intercept -5.9769** 2005 -5.3375 2004 2011 
Estonia 
Intercept -4.3854*** 2012 -9.2491*** 2008 2011 
Trend and Intercept -3.5264 2006 -5.9851 2008 2011 
Hungary 
Intercept -3.4236*** 2008 -8.1810*** 2007 2013 
Trend and Intercept -3.649*** 2008 -6.6753 2002 2012 
Latvia 
Intercept -1.0551* 2012 -1.7294 2007 2013 
Trend and Intercept -5.8861*** 2009 -9.1194*** 2008 2011 
Lithuvania 
Intercept -4.0326 2007 -3.5942 2007 2010 
Trend and Intercept -3.8269*** 2009 -6.8223** 2000 2008 
Poland 
Intercept -5.3833 2009 -7.3695*** 2009 2013 
Trend and Intercept -6.2836** 2010 -6.1462 2009 2012 
Romania 
Intercept -4.7444** 2003 -6.4586** 2002 2008 
Trend and Intercept -4.4737* 2003 -4.9563 2002 2008 
Slovakia 
Intercept -3.8808 2008 -4.6974 2007 2011 
Trend and Intercept -4.7596 2007 -7.6579*** 2006 2009 
Slovenia 
Intercept -3.3568 2013 -4.3106 2007 2012 
Trend and Intercept -5.128 2007 -9.0167*** 2008 2013 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Rats 9.10. 
 *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance 
while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
a) For Zivot and Andrews test automatic lag length selection based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 7. Asymptotic distribution of the 
minimum t-statistic and critical values are provided by Zivot and Andrews (1992, Table 1) : -5.34 (for 1 per cent level) and -4.93 (5 per cent level) and -4.58. 
b) The Lumsdaine and Papell test based on based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8. Asymptotic critical values reported by Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997, Table 1) are -6.74, -6.16 and -5.89 for 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively . 
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Table 6.4. Tests for Structural Change in the Primary Balance, (1995–2015) 
 
Country Assumption 
Zivot and Andrews (1992)
a)
 Lumsdaine and Papell (1997)
b)
 
t-stat   ̂ t-stat   ̂   ̂ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bulgaria 
Intercept -3.1262 2005 -3.1420 2006 2011 
Trend and Intercept -3.8087 2006 -11.0281*** 2005 2013 
Czech Republic 
Intercept -8.029** 2014 8.2447*** 2010 2013 
Trend and Intercept -4.5348*** 2009 -11.3042*** 2005 2013 
Estonia 
Intercept -5.1186*** 2008 -5.7307 2002 2007 
Trend and Intercept -4.8996 2008 -12.6343*** 2000 2007 
Hungary 
Intercept -4.4815*** 2002 -6.1092* 2001 2011 
Trend and Intercept -6.04*** 2002 -8.6146*** 2001 2007 
Latvia 
Intercept -6.8169* 2013 -7.5785*** 2006 2011 
Trend and Intercept -6.9193*** 2008 -9.3723*** 2006 2013 
Lithuvania 
Intercept -4.2277** 2008 -5.7607 2008 2012 
Trend and Intercept -5.5315** 2009 -6.2024 2008 2012 
Poland 
Intercept -4.0547* 2013 -5.3966 2006 2013 
Trend and Intercept -5.0063* 2009 -7.0369** 2002 2008 
Romania 
Intercept -4.199* 2008 -6.5186** 2007 2012 
Trend and Intercept -4.9227** 2008 -5.9510 2006 2010 
Slovakia 
Intercept -4.6709 2006 -7.1820*** 1999 2008 
Trend and Intercept -6.4654*** 2009 -7.0920** 2002 2008 
Slovenia 
Intercept -5.2203** 2013 -9.0682*** 2006 2012 
Trend and Intercept -4.0066*** 2013 -3.6342 2006 2010 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Rats 9.10. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance 
while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
a) For Zivot and Andrews test automatic lag length selection based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8.Critical values reported by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992, Table 1) are -5.34 (for 1 per cent level) and -4.8 (5 per cent level). 
b) The Lumsdaine and Papell test based on based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag of 8. Asymptotic critical values reported by Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997, Table 1) are -6.74, -6.16 and -5.89 for 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively . 
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Appendix 7. Results of first generation panel unit root tests  
Table 7.1. Panel data unit root tests for the government debt-to-GDP ratio, (1995–2015) 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  1.14745  0.8744  10  181 
Breitung t-stat  0.81962  0.7938  10  171 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -0.52562  0.2996  10  181 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  27.7927  0.1144  10  181 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  16.4229  0.6901  10  198 
     
      
 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Eviews 8. 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC; Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) allows for fixed effects and unitspecific time trends, whereas the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is restricted to 
be homogeneous across all units of the panel. In contrast, the Im, Pesaran and Chin (1997) test allows for individual unit root processes, letting the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to vary across cross sections. While the alternative hypothesis to the null of unit root in the LLC test is that 
all series are stationary, the alternative in the IPS framework is that some cross sections are without unit root. The null hypothesis being tested by 
Fisher-type tests is that all panels contain a unit root. The alternative is that at least one panel is stationary. 
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Table 7.2. Panel data unit root tests for the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, (1995–2015) 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.37942  0.0087  10  190 
Breitung t-stat -2.89683  0.0019  10  180 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.03054  0.0000  10  190 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  49.1839  0.0003  10  190 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  48.8653  0.0003  10  200 
     
      
 
Note: Tests were carried out by using Eviews 8. 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC; Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) allows for fixed effects and unitspecific time trends, whereas the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is restricted to 
be homogeneous across all units of the panel. In contrast, the Im, Pesaran and Chin (IPS henceforth, see Im et al., 1997) test allows for individual unit 
root processes, letting the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to vary across cross sections. While the alternative hypothesis to the null of unit 
root in the LLC test is that all series are stationary, the alternative in the IPS framework is that some crosssections are without unit root. The null 
hypothesis being tested by Fisher-type tests is that all panels contain a unit root. The alternative is that at least one panel is stationary. 
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Appendix 8. Fiscal reaction function results 
Table 8.1. Fiscal policy reaction function: GLS coefficient estimates, CEE-10, 1995-2008 
 
Note: The models include fixed effects dummies and are estimated using GLS cross-section weights and White cross-section coefficient-covariance 
method. Model 1 is the baseline model, while models 2 to 5 are extensions to the baseline. P-values are given in the parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation. 
Dependent variable :      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
0.2294** 
(0.1) 
0.1774* 
(0.099) 
0.2093* 
(0.0953) 
0.2316** 
(1.2302) 
0.2332** 
(0.1018) 
       
0.0543 
(0.0479) 
-0.0006 
(0.0477) 
0.0503 
(0.0466) 
0.0589 
(0.05256) 
0.062 
(0.0488) 
        
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
9.25E-05 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
      
0.1281*** 
(0.0119) 
0.1616*** 
(0.0186) 
0.1293*** 
(0.0141) 
0.1262*** 
(0.0129) 
0.1197*** 
(0.0138) 
       
-0.0362*** 
(0.008) 
0.0007 
(0.0157) 
-0.0666*** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0516*** 
(0.0088) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0082) 
     
-0.0603* 
(0.0593) 
-0.0274 
(0.0295) 
-0.0389 
(0.0297) 
-0.0745** 
(0.0355) 
-0.0658** 
(0.0275) 
       
0.8227** 
(0.3211) 
   
        
0.4212* 
(0.229) 
  
         
1.4787*** 
(0.4561) 
 
            
-0.2173 
(0.2443) 
Const 
0.1727 
(1.1086) 
-2.4389* 
(1.4622) 
-6.6673* 
(3.708) 
0.7657 
(1.2302) 
0.2912 
(1.1315) 
No. of observations 96 96 96 96 96 
Adjusted R‐squared 0.6788 0.7304 0.6666 0.7066 0.6816 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.7783 1.802 1.8063 1.7832 1.7675 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test 3.4191** 4.8995*** 3.2842*** 4.4283*** 3.4715.*** 
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Table 8.2. Fiscal policy reaction function: GLS coefficient estimates, CEE-10, 2008-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The models include fixed effects dummies and are estimated using GLS cross-section weights and White cross-section coefficient-covariance 
method. Model 1 is the baseline model, while models 2 to 6 are extensions to the baseline. P-values are given in the parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1: variable is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Source: own calculation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
0.3623*** 
(0.0571) 
0.3164*** 
(0.0587) 
0.3674*** 
(0.0548) 
0.3727*** 
(0.0598) 
0.3573*** 
(0.0427) 
0.343*** 
(0.0536) 
       
0.1718*** 
(0.0457) 
0.2207*** 
(0.0796) 
0.172*** 
(0.0448) 
0.1742*** 
(0.0399) 
0.1626*** 
(0.0426) 
0.1643*** 
(0.0415) 
        
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
-0.0009 
(0.0009) 
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
-0.001* 
(0.0006) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0009* 
(0.0006) 
      
0.067 
(0.0872) 
0.0508 
(0.0877) 
0.0759 
(0.1022) 
0.0738 
(0.0992) 
0.1287 
(0.0834) 
0.0854 
(0.0828) 
       
0.194*** 
(0.0204) 
0.1444*** 
(0.0277) 
0.2019*** 
(0.0249) 
0.1884*** 
(0.0177) 
0.2468*** 
(0.0395) 
0.1884*** 
(0.0216) 
     
-0.2329*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.1632*** 
(0.0226) 
-0.2295*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.2227*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.1601*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.2286*** 
(0.0113) 
       
-1.8875** 
(0.8386) 
    
        
-0.0845 
(0.2348) 
   
         
-0.0451 
(0.1716) 
  
ump     
0.3857* 
(0.2084) 
 
             
-0.3917 
(0.3776) 
Const 
-24.558*** 
(2.6592) 
-18.635*** 
(2.2353) 
-23.259*** 
(5.4416) 
-24.01606*** 
(2.4629) 
-29.299*** 
(3.0104) 
-23.753*** 
(2.9368) 
No. of observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Adjusted R‐squared 0.8069 0.7609 0.804 0.7891 0.8181 0.8466 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.4905 2.4395 2.4933 2.4889 2.5078 2.4913 
Redundant Fixed Effects 
Test 
5.1556*** 4.1718*** 4.1108*** 4.8364*** 
6.0128*** 
5.1104*** 
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